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Abstract 
 
Eight years after the start of the financial crisis, the most developed economies across 
the globe are still suffering from the effects of the economic downturn. More than a 
crunch in credit, derivatives, property or equity markets, the global financial crisis had 
become a general economic recession with cross-border effects on employment, 
national policy and social welfare. 
This project analyzes the impact of the run in the ABCP market that started on August 
9, 2007, on the stock return performance of European banks that were guaranteeing 
conduits’ investment in the United States. We provide empirical evidence that those 
banking institutions were the most affected by the financial turmoil, since the beginning 
of the recession. Also, we determine that banks with higher conduit exposure and 
European banks sponsoring ABCP conduit vehicles in the US have received the largest 
loan amount from the Fed’s Term Auction Facility (TAF) lending program, established 
on December 12, 2007.  
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Resumo 
 
Oito anos após o início da crise financeira, as economias mais desenvolvidas do mundo 
continuam a sofrer as consequências negativas do declínio económico. Mais do que um 
choque nos mercados de crédito, derivados, imobiliário ou de capitais, a crise financeira 
foi uma verdadeira recessão económica com efeitos globais no emprego, política 
nacional e bem-estar social. 
A presente dissertação analisa o impacto da “corrida” ao mercado de emissão de papel 
comercial com garantias (asset-backed comercial paper), com início a 9 de Agosto de 
2007, nas rendibilidades dos bancos europeus que ofereciam garantias ao investimento 
em papel comercial. O estudo fornece evidência empírica de que os bancos europeus 
que administravam veículos de titularização nos Estados Unidos foram os mais afetados 
pela crise financeira. Determina ainda que tanto as instituições bancárias com maior 
exposição à emissão de papel comercial, como os bancos europeus que garantiam o 
investimento em papel comercial nos Estados Unidos, foram aqueles que receberam os 
maiores montantes de empréstimo através do programa Term Auction Facility (TAF) 
implementado pela Reserva Federal, a 12 de Dezembro de 2007. 
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Auction Facility (TAF), bancos europeus, Estados Unidos da América 
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1. Introduction 
 
The 2007-2009 Financial Crisis, precipitated by the turmoil in the subprime mortgage-
backed securities sector, was considered the most severe international economic 
catastrophe since the Great Depression, in 1929. More than a crunch in credit, 
derivatives, property or equity markets, the global financial crisis became a general 
economic recession with cross-border effects on employment, national policy and social 
welfare.  
But how did the problems in the housing market, a relatively small part of the overall 
financial system, turned into such a profound worldwide recession? In fact, throughout 
recent years, asset price bubbles on real estate and stock exchanges were common to a 
large majority of financial crises. Severely inflated housing and stock values in Japan 
from 1985 to 1989, the massive real estate bubble on Thailand and Asian Countries in 
1992-1997 or the DotCom distress, which covered the period from 1997 to 2000, were 
examples of rapid acceleration of asset prices and overheated economic activity. 
However, the fears for financial contagion, and the extension of the crises themselves, 
have never had the strength of 2007-2009.  
The answer to this question is that the early downturn was actually focused on real 
banking; banks are central to operational and investment activities in companies, 
governments and even in providing credit to families, so, when facing insolvency, they 
can have serious impacts on the general economy and market functioning. Thus, and 
although the first signs of distress were shown in the housing market, the crisis had 
actually been brewing for a number of consecutive years in the global banking system, 
with risks, differently from what had happened in previous shocks, being fully shared 
by the industry.  
For the past decades, traditional banking activities of granting and holding loans had 
been increasingly replaced by securitization agreements, and large banks had gradually 
became actual intermediaries between investors and borrowers, packaging and reselling 
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loans in the capital markets (Brunnermeier, 2008). Securitization was primarily a risk 
sharing process, allowing banks to place large portfolios of assets into off-balance sheet 
special purpose vehicles (SPVs), which funded their acquisitions by selling short-term 
debt and particularly asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) – the most traditional 
form of short-term credit – to outside investors. The special purpose vehicles would 
then slice the portfolios into tranches with different seniority and offered interest rates, 
and finally issue asset-backed securities (ABS) in the market. 
As in traditional bank runs, where customers tried en masse to withdraw their saving 
deposits, the 2007-2009 financial crisis was the result of a system-wide bank run on the 
intermediation shadow banking sector (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Immediately after 
the housing bubble burst, with subprime owners being unable to meet their mortgage 
payments, investors became increasingly reluctant in rolling over asset-backed 
commercial paper and other forms of short-term credit, causing financial markets to 
collapse. Similarly to what happened with traditional banks, which financed their 
operations via short-term deposits, the financial intermediation system was exposed to 
large maturity mismatches, purchasing medium to long-term assets by issuing short-
term debt (Brunnermeier, 2008). Thus, when investors started demanding exceptionally 
high yields for new ABCP and other short-term debt instruments, the special purpose 
vehicles established by banks had severe difficulties in repaying their creditors. 
However, losses in the ABCP and other debt markets were not borne by third-party 
investors themselves, but by large banking institutions, instead. Contrarily to the usual 
purpose of securitization, banks were providing the special purpose vehicles with 
explicit credit and liquidity guarantees which created recourse back onto banking 
institutions’ balance sheets. Acharya et al. (2013), analyzing the turmoil in the ABCP 
market, demonstrated that banks were setting up off balance sheet vehicles, not with the 
objective of minimizing risk, but instead of lowering their capital adequacy 
requirements. In the run up to the crisis, special purpose vehicles – or conduits, for 
ABCP investments – allowed banking institutions to increase their risk taking behavior, 
while maintaining compliance with regulatory weighted ratios. As they were 
guaranteeing conduits’ investment, banks were required to pay off maturing ABCP in 
the event of a default. 
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We specifically focus on the run on the ABCP market that started in August, 2007, after 
the announcement of BNP Paribas, which suspended withdrawals from three of its 
investment funds. Asset-backed commercial paper was the most important form of 
short-term debt in the years preceding the financial crisis and a central funding 
mechanism for structured investment vehicles (Shleifer, 2010) and private-label assets 
in the United States (Krishnamurthy et al. 2014). 
Following Acharya and Schnabl (2010), and using conduit data from Moody’s Investors 
Service, we assess asset-backed commercial paper sponsorship for all commercial banks 
in the United States and other markets. We conclude that European banks were the 
largest administrators of ABCP conduit vehicles, concentrating 73 percent of their 
investments in the US market. In recent decades, European banks had heavily increased 
their cross-border positions in foreign assets, particularly investing in dollars in the 
United States. As noted in Acharya and Schnabl (2010) and Shin (2012), European 
banking institutions usually hedged their currency risk by issuing short-term debt in the 
US market. However, and even though they were protecting themselves against 
exchange rate fluctuations, European banks were exposed to important currency 
mismatches, by investing in a currency other than their owns.  
Our work provides empirical evidence that European banks sponsoring conduit vehicles 
in the United States were the most affected by the financial crisis. When the turmoil in 
the ABCP market started, European banks were not able to increase dollar funding by as 
much as they needed. While US banks could turn to their domestic deposits’ market or 
the Federal Home Bank Loans system (FHBL), as alternative sources of financing, 
European banks had to try to raise liquidity in the dollar-denominated wholesales 
market or by accessing local deposits and exchanging them into US dollars, at the 
prevailing rate of exchange. 
We argue that European banks sponsoring ABCP investments in the US faced 
additional exposure to conduit activity because, in the event that their funding positions 
could not be rolled over, they had to repay their creditors in non-domestic currency. At 
the start of the financial crisis, when both the interbank and the foreign exchange 
markets were facing serious disruptions, European and other foreign bank sponsors 
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investing in the United States, obliged to secure alternative sources of funding in order 
to offset the losses in the ABCP market, were subjected to severe liquidity shortages, 
due to the differences in access to dollar funding. 
We test for the impact of currency mismatches on the equity returns of European banks 
that were providing explicit guarantees to conduit activity in the United States. We 
focus our analysis on the narrow 3-day window period around the start of the financial 
crisis, on August 9, and find that European banks with US ABCP exposure were 
experiencing the lowest stock returns since the beginning of the ABCP turmoil. Our 
results are robust when controlling for bank-specific characteristics and when applied to 
the entire month of August, 2007, where the negative effect of the ABCP shock on 
European banks backing conduits’ investment in the US is higher than the encountered 
for the three-day window period. Also, we find no statistical significance for the months 
prior to August, 2007, except for July (where the coefficient for our dummy variable is 
positive), suggesting that the weaker performance of European bank sponsors backing 
ABCP investments in the US was fueled by currency mismatches in conduit activity. 
Finally, we present and describe the main conventional and unconventional policy 
measures set up by the Federal Reserve, in order to provide liquidity to financial 
institutions in distress. In fact, when the Fed’s officials, following the implementation of 
the Dodd-Frank Act, were forced to release detailed information on the special aid 
programs used to respond to the recent financial crisis, the disclosures revealed the 
extension of the Fed’s aid to banks operating in the US.  
After December 12, 2007, branches of foreign banks located in the United States were 
able to borrow from the Term Auction Facility (TAF) Program. At the same time, and 
with the objective of further extending the international reach of the TAF, the Federal 
Reserve set up the Central Bank Liquidity Swap Lines Facility with fourteen foreign 
central banks. On March and September, 2008, at the time Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers’ collapsed, the Fed implemented the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), 
the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money 
Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), the Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF) and the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF). Collectively, foreign banks 
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received 65 percent of the total loan amount made available by the Fed’s special 
liquidity programs, with the European Central Bank, the Bank of England and the Swiss 
National Bank taking over 80, 9 and 5 percent, respectively, of the contracted US dollar 
swap agreements. 
We particularly focus on the TAF lending program, the first amongst the large set of the 
liquidity facilities implemented by the Federal Reserve, since the start of the financial 
crisis. The Term Auction Facility, by guaranteeing perfect anonymity to all borrowing 
institutions in the program, provided a satisfactory alternative to Discount Window 
lending and was implemented when it became clear that the use of traditional monetary 
tools were not able to improve the overall economic conditions, following the ABCP 
shock. 
We match TAF’s bank-level data to information on conduit activity provided by 
Moody’s Investors Service. We follow the view presented in Shin (2012), where the 
author argues that the European banks’ use of the Term Auction Facility was an 
indicator of banking dollar shortages, since the beginning of the 2007 turmoil. We 
empirically test for that hypothesis and find both that banks with higher conduit 
exposure, as measured by the ratio between total ABCP outstanding and bank equity, 
and European banks sponsoring conduit vehicles in the United States have received the 
largest loan amounts through the TAF lending program. The conclusion is consistent 
with the results on our first regression analysis, which confirms that European 
commercial banks sponsoring conduit vehicles in the US were the most affected by the 
ABCP crisis that started on August 9, 2007. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an overview 
on the most relevant studies in our topic of analysis and Section 3 explains the role of 
banking activity in the leading up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis. Section 4 provides 
for a characterization on the ABCP market, specifically analyzing European bank’s 
exposure to US conduit activity and Section 5 describes the main conventional and 
unconventional policy tools established by the Federal Reserve since the ABCP shock. 
Section 6 presents data, methodology and results for our regression analyses and 
Section 7 summarizes the main conclusions of our work. 
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2. Literature Review 
 
The fears for financial contagion had never had the strength of 2007. The global 
financial crisis was a general economic recession with cross-border effects on 
employment, national policy and social welfare, and was considered the most severe 
international economic catastrophe since the Great Depression, in 1929. 
What developed in late 2007 and into 2008 was a systemic-wide bank run that took 
place in the shadow banking sector, where severe stoppages in short-term financing 
caused financial markets to collapse (Mishkin, 2010). Pozsar et al. (2010) provide for a 
comprehensive view on shadow banking, studying in detail its institutional features and 
economic role: the volume of credit intermediation amounted to 20 trillion dollars in the 
US, nearly twice the 11 trillion for the traditional banking system. 
A number of recent studies have examined the importance of short-term debt runs in 
precipitating the credit crunch.  
Hördahl and King (2008), Gorton (2009), Gorton and Metrick (2009, 2012) and Gorton 
et al. (2010) focus on the sudden drying up of liquidity in the repo market. Sale and 
repurchase agreements were responsible for funding securitized assets in the shadow 
banking system, allowing for ABS maturity transformation. Gorton and Metrick (2012) 
use a measure of counterparty risk to demonstrate that the panic of 2007-08 was 
effectively a run on repo and that the weakening of the subprime alone was not the strict 
cause of systemic problems. Shleifer (2010) discusses the propositions in Gorton and 
Metrick’s (2012) work, arguing that there is no sustained reason for accepting 
withdrawals in repo market, rather than defaults on commercial paper, as the state-cause 
for systemic problems, this given the increased contraction in ABCP in the years 
preceding the recession.  
Similarly to Shleifer (2010), also Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) question the importance 
of sale and repurchase agreements as a method for funding asset-backed securities and 
financial institutions, in general. Specifically, they found that repo transactions of 
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private-label ABS corresponded to a reduced amount of $196 billion (or $359 billion if 
repo extended against corporate bonds is included) when compared to the outstanding 
ABCP financing of 1,173 billion dollars. Schroth et al. (2014) have too looked at asset-
backed commercial paper as a means for assessing the determinants of debt runs at the 
onset of the crisis, measuring its sensitivity against coordination failures, asset volatility 
and liquidity, maturity mismatches, leverage and guarantees’ strength. Differently from 
past works, the authors introduce a structural estimation approach, empirically showing 
that ABCP yields may be utilized in forecasting debt runs. 
Runs on ABCP programs are further documented in Covitz et al. (2009), Kacperczyk 
and Schnabl (2009) and Arteta et al. (2013). When the turmoil in the subprime 
mortgages sector unfolded, investors became increasingly reluctant in rolling-over 
ABCP, causing severe losses to commercial banks which were guaranteeing conduits’ 
investments. 
Also important was the run on money market funds that followed the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers in September, 2008. Dwyer and Tkac (2009), McCabe (2010) and 
Baba et al. (2009) explain the main events that occurred in the US money market fund 
(MMF) industry, after the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck on September 16, 
while Bengtsson (2013) concentrates in the developments for the MMF European 
sector.  
Our paper is part of an extensive body of literature that studies the impacts of the ABCP 
shock on banking institutions during the financial crisis.  
Acharya and Richardson (2009) and Acharya et al. (2013) center their studies on asset-
backed commercial paper and present regulatory arbitrage, in the pre-crisis period, as 
the primary business in the financial sector. Commercial banks, subjected to capital-
adequacy requirements, saw in securitization a possibility of placing assets in off-
balance sheet ABCP conduit vehicles, avoiding maintaining costly cash buffers against 
them. However, because they secured the underlying credit to investors by providing 
explicit guarantees to conduit activity, banks ended up on holding the effective risk and 
were securitizing without transferring risks to outside investors. Acharya et al. (2013) 
empirically test for the regulatory arbitrage hypothesis, examining whether more capital 
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constrained banks were more likely to set up conduit vehicles. Also, they study 
guarantees’ structure and its effect on conduits’ ability to roll-over maturing ABCP and 
demonstrate that outside investors in the market did not suffer losses on conduit 
activity. Finally, they examine the impacts of conduit exposure on banking stock returns 
from August 8 to August 10, 2007, and conclude that commercial bank sponsors were 
the most negatively affected by the  ABCP shock in the early stages of the recession. 
In related work, Acharya and Schnabl (2010) show that the geography of the financial 
crisis was determined by the incentives of global banks in manufacturing high rating 
securities, through the establishing of asset-backed commercial paper conduits. They 
empirically demonstrate that commercial banks of countries in surplus became as 
exposed to the recession as the US and other deficit markets, and argue that global 
imbalances
1
 fall short in justifying the extension of the early turmoil, since the 
production of risk-free assets had no direct correlation with countries’ current accounts. 
As in Acharya et al. (2013), the authors test for the hypothesis that banks with larger 
conduit exposure were the most affected by the ABCP crisis. However, because they 
study cumulative stock returns for the entire month of August, 2007, rather than 
focusing on a shorter window event, the authors may be including in their analysis other 
variables with effects on bank performance, some of which correlated with conduit 
sponsorship. Lastly, and following their analysis on the geography of asset-backed 
commercial paper conduits, they suggest that European bank sponsors, as they were the 
largest conduit administrators in the United States, were exposed to significant dollar 
shortages in the beginning of the financial crisis. 
Whereas several authors document the extent of the US dollar shortage, focusing on the 
difficulties for foreign banks in accessing US dollar funding in the period that followed 
the ABCP shock, they do not provide empirical evidence that they were the most 
affected by the ABCP run. 
McGuire and Von Peter (2009) introduce a measure of the US dollar shortage, based on 
the maturity gap between US dollar-denominated claims and liabilities, and examine 
cross currency funding as the amount to which banks were investing in one currency but 
                                                          
1 
A pure global imbalances’ theory argues that the increased excess savings in some markets, combined 
with current account deficits for other countries, can lead to severe financial sector distortions. 
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financing in another. The use of the foreign exchange swap market for European major 
banks was increasingly difficult when credit conditions tightened after the onset of the 
financial crisis. The authors analyze banks’ funding risk through their measure of the 
US funding gap, considering country-level data from BIS
2
 international statistics.  
Ivashina et al. (2012), although focusing on the period from May 2011, to June 2012, 
also stress out the importance of the foreign exchange swap market for foreign banks 
investing in the US. They show that, in the presence of heightened market credit 
concerns and limited arbitrage, a surge in the demand for foreign exchange swaps could 
have negative effects on the cost of dollar funding, by altering the covered interest 
parity. Specifically, they demonstrate that European banks lending in the US domestic 
market cut their dollar loans, more than their euro loans, in the presence of an adverse 
credit shock. 
On the other hand, Shin (2012) provides evidence that European banking institutions 
had an important impact on the credit conditions in the United States market, via 
shadow banks. Global European banks, despite having a limited presence in the US 
deposit market, were able to mask their gross dollar positions by issuing asset-backed 
commercial paper in the US. According to the author, European banks functioned as 
channels through which financial conditions were transmitted around the globe. Further, 
Shin (2012) looks at European banks’ use of the Term Auction Facility, established by 
the Federal Reserve, referring that European banking firms exposed to dollar-
denominated ABCP were subjected to higher liquidity shortages than US banks, since 
the early stages of the financial crisis.  
Acharya et al. (2007) study the liquidity shock by restricting their analysis to the period 
before the implementation of the TAF program. They examine the differences in access 
to dollar funding between foreign and US banks, showing that foreign banks with 
ABCP exposure increased their spreads for syndicated loans denominated in US dollars. 
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) also address the channels of financial contagion during 
the recent crisis. The authors look at the role of global banks in the transmission of 
funding shocks, focusing on parent banking companies, reallocating liquidity within the 
                                                          
2
 Bank for International Setlements. 
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organization. In the past decades, banks have increasingly established branches and 
subsidiaries in foreign countries, which allowed for the propagation of liquidity shocks 
at an international scale. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2012) focus on two different events 
for testing funding dynamics within banking institutions, the first being the US dollar 
shortage in the last quarters of 2007 and the second, and positive shock, of the 
implementation of the Term Auction Facility.  
Closer to our work, Kamin and DeMarco (2012) study whether countries that held the 
largest amounts of US mortgage-backed securities and that were the highest dependent 
on US dollar funding were the ones experiencing the greater distress during the 
financial crisis. Also basing on country-level data, Gourinchas et al. (2012), determine 
if losses on countries’ debt portfolios are related to their conduit exposure or the 
McGuire and Von Peter (2009) measure of US dollar shortage. 
We add to the existent literature by using individual bank data in examining whether 
European banks that were guaranteeing ABCP conduits’ investment in the US were the 
most affected by the financial crisis, since the beginning of the turmoil. Our 
specification approach follows the data treatment and basic methodology in Acharya et 
al. (2013), where the authors evaluate if banking institutions sponsoring conduit 
activity, in the United States and Europe, were the ones experiencing the lowest conduit 
returns at the start of the financial crisis. We distinguish from Acharya et al. (2013) by 
studying the impact of currency mismatches on the cumulative returns of European 
banks sponsoring ABCP investments in the United States, determining whether those 
banking institutions were the most harmed by the liquidity crisis. 
Also, and based on the early studies of Cecchetti (2008, 2009) and Bernanke (2008, 
2009b) we describe the main conventional and unconventional policy measures 
implemented by the Federal Reserve, in order to provide liquidity to financial 
institutions in distress. We specifically focus on the Term Auction Facility Program, 
one of the most utilized facilities by European banking companies, since it was first 
established on December 12, 2007, by the Fed’s officials.  
While most literature related to the use of the TAF is concentrated on the effectiveness 
of the program in lowering the spreads in the interbank market, little is known about the 
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banks participating in the Fed’s auctions. In fact, researchers have not yet reached a 
consensus on the success of the Term Auction Facility. Taylor and Williams (2008) 
show that the program was not able to reduce the spread between Libor and the Federal 
funds rate and Thornton (2010) argues that at the time of its announcement, the TAF 
was responsible for increasing the risk premium in financial markets. Conversely, Wu 
(2008, 2011) finds empirical evidence that the government facility had an important 
effect in reducing the financial strains in the interbank money market. 
Our work is related to Benmelech (2012) and Broz (2012), both demonstrating that 
European banks were the largest beneficiaries of the Term Auction Facility, since its 
implementation. Benmelech (2012), in particular, carefully examines the structure of the 
loans granted under the TAF program, showing that lending to US banks only exceeded 
borrowing by foreign banking institutions in the period immediately following the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. We follow the view presented in Shin (2012), arguing 
that the banks’ use of the Term Auction Facility was an indicator of banking liquidity 
shortages after the ABCP shock. Specifically, we analyze whether European banks 
sponsoring conduit vehicles in the United States were the largest beneficiaries of the 
Term Auction Facility since 12th December, 2007. 
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3. The 2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis 
 
In the period preceding the 2007-2008 global financial crisis, the low interest rate 
environment granted ease of access to credit, allowing mortgage lenders to borrow at 
extremely favorable terms, causing the escalation of real estate prices. In fact, home 
owners in the American housing market were able to easily secure credit and refinance 
their existing mortgages at better rates, by simply relying on the continuing upper 
movement in market values. Prior to 2007, the sector was critical in guaranteeing 
economic success, helping in the recovery that followed the Internet bubble burst in 
year 2000. However, and precisely because regulators feared a deflationary period after 
the DotCom crash, they continued to promote a policy of generous credit flows and low 
interest rates that eventually lead to the buildup of the housing bubble (Bezemer, 2011).  
At the same time, “the banking system underwent an important transformation”, with 
traditional banking activities of granting and holding loans being increasingly replaced 
by securitization agreements (Brunnermeier, 2008). Large investment and commercial 
banks gradually became actual intermediaries between investors and borrowers by 
packaging and reselling loans in the capital markets. Under the banking “originate to 
distribute model”, mortgages, corporate bonds and other forms of credit were pooled 
together and sold to special purpose vehicles (SPVs), which functioned as off-balance 
sheet entities, providing for credit risk transfer. Securitization was essentially a risk 
sharing process intended to divide and distribute risky positions for a large number of 
investors (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). The mechanism itself involved combining 
different classes of loans into one large portfolio of assets that would then be 
transformed and resold to third-party investors in the form of securities. SPVs were thus 
responsible for slicing portfolios into different tranches according to their seniority and 
offered interest rates. As in standard capital structures, first losses on the pool would be 
allocated to the most junior tranches, followed by mezzanine, and super senior tranches, 
AAA rated. The asset backed securities (ABS), issued by SPVs, represented these same 
exact slices and were backed by the portfolios of loans held by the special purpose 
entities (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Nevertheless, one should note that the newly issued 
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AAA-rated securities were not necessarily backed by very high quality credit. In reality, 
super senior tranches might be set up with recourse to a portfolio of nonprime loans, but 
defined as safer investments, with a first lien on the assets of the pool (Acharya and 
Richardson, 2009). Hence, the securitization mechanism made it possible to certain 
institutional investors to purchase assets they were previously prevented from holding, 
according to the established legal capital requirements (Brunnermeier, 2008). 
SPVs, although they did not involve public issuance of equity, were actually very 
similar to real banks, as they were built with the purpose of collecting principal and 
interest payments on the underlying assets, handing them out to ABS investors. They 
allowed for risk sharing by performing maturity, credit and liquidity transformation and 
were part of the intermediation system, shadow banking. Shadow banks included all 
non-bank financial intermediaries that are not subjected to strict regulation, but carry 
out activities that were generally associated with traditional banking (Acharya et al., 
2013). In the run up to the crisis, shadow banks were the key financiers of securitized 
assets, funding their asset purchases in the short-term asset-backed commercial paper 
markets or through other sources of financing outside the regulated banking sector. 
Similarly to traditional banks, which financed their operations with short-term deposits, 
the financial intermediation system was exposed to large maturity mismatches, 
purchasing medium to long-term assets by issuing short-term debt (Brunnermeier, 
2008). 
SPVs, whether they took the form of corporations, trusts, partnerships or limited 
liability companies, were characterized as bankruptcy remote vehicles, being 
independent from claims on the sponsoring bank, should it became insolvent. However, 
sponsorship was not exclusive for commercial and investment banks, with finance 
companies, hedge funds or insurance firms also placing assets off-balance sheet via 
special purpose entities. SPV structures were thus employed across the financial sector, 
in “programs for commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), collateralized debt 
obligations (CDOs), collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), asset-backed commercial 
paper (ABCP) programs, and structured investment vehicles (SIVs)” (BIS, 2009). In 
addition to having their investment backed by an asset pool, buyers of these types of 
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securities could protect themselves against the risk of default of a particular bond or 
tranche by purchasing credit default swaps (CDS).  
The rising popularity of securitized products was particularly important for the 
subprime sector, with approximately 80 percent of property mortgages to be financed 
via securitization (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). Housing was a mainstay of the US 
economy and an actual robust business investment for financial institutions, unable, at 
that moment, to profit from the established level of interest rates. Accounting for more 
than one fifth of the American GDP, spread over residential construction, household 
furniture, rental payments and other equivalent expenditures, the nation’s real estate 
stock ascended to 17,8 trillion dollars (Schwartz, 2014), turning into a major attraction 
for securitized products. By increasing the distance between originators and borrowers, 
securitization mechanisms ultimately lead to poor-quality lending and may have 
accelerated the trend towards extending credit to riskier homeowners (Keys et al., 
2008), actively fuelling the real estate bubble. 
After 2001, the number of clients investing in the housing sector, mostly through the 
companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, was progressively higher. The two 
government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) were created as a part and post-Franklin 
Roosevelt’s New Deal, in an attempt of injecting liquidity in the mortgage market: loans 
were bundled, tranched and then resold via securitization, offering the opportunity of 
constructing triple-A-rated securities through the pooling of below-investment-grade 
assets. As GSEs, the firms had their investments guaranteed by the US federal 
government, so, when banks started to grant credit to families with limited resources, 
requiring no downpayments or proof of income, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
continued issuing the newly created securities. Subprime mortgages were a leading 
financial innovation between 2001 and 2006, functioning as short-maturity instruments, 
under a ‘balloon interest payment’. Families that otherwise did not qualify for a home 
loan, started benefiting from a two-step contract that could be refinanced at the due 
date, avoiding the jump in the mortgage rate after two or three years of affordable 
refund (Gorton, 2008). The mechanism worked quite well as long as house prices 
continued to appreciate, with lenders either allowing for loan restructuring or keeping 
the property as consideration.  
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However, pre-crisis household market values and price annual increases of 10 percent 
came to a downturn in late 2006. Contrarily to the prevailing expectations and despite of 
the soft loan terms, virtually all subprime homeowners were unable to meet their 
mortgage payments, causing the system to collapse. Coupled with the steady increase 
on interest rates from 2004 onwards, the event of a widespread series of defaults in the 
subprime sector confirmed the undeniable flaw in the newly applied securitized system. 
Reductions in home construction and diminished demand for building supplies caused 
mortgage backed securities’ values to decline, with lenders on the subprime sector 
asking for higher collateral, given the decrease in housing prices.  
The period that followed announced the immediate bankruptcy of Ownit Mortgage 
Solutions and New Century Financial, a clear indication that “the subprime game had 
ended” (Schwartz, 2014). Losses promptly extended to investment banks, pension and 
hedge funds that had placed large sums in real estate related products, actively seeking 
for yield enhancement and higher profits. Mounting delinquencies in the sector shook 
investors’ confidence in the financial intermediaries that were issuing liabilities against 
subprime loans. Consequently, investors became increasingly reluctant in rolling over 
short-term debt and particularly ABCP, the most traditional form of short-term credit 
and a central funding channel for structured investment vehicles and conduits, in the 
years preceding the financial crisis (Shleifer, 2010). What happened was analogous to 
traditional bank runs in the past century, where customers tried en masse to withdraw 
their saving deposits (Gorton and Metrick, 2012). In 2007-2009, the severe stoppages in 
short term refinancing, with soaring yields for new issuances, lead to an unprecedented 
shadow bank run that caused financial markets to collapse. 
On July 31, 2007, two Bear Stearns’ hedge funds, that had invested huge amounts in 
securitized subprime mortgages and collateralized debt obligations, filed for 
bankruptcy. One week later, on August 9, 2007, BNP Paribas halted withdrawals from 
three of its investment funds, on the account of a complete evaporation of liquidity. 
Values for ABCP outstanding, the largest money market instrument for the US market, 
decreased $190 billion in August 2007 and by an additional $160 billion until December 
that year (Covitz et al., 2009). Within one day of BNP Paribas announcement, the 
interest rate spread of overnight ABCP over the federal funds rate jumped from 10 to 
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150 basis points (Acharya et al., 2013). In the period that followed, the Federal Reserve 
tried to inject liquidity in the asset-backed commercial paper market, via overnight 
repurchase agreements and discount-window loans. On December 12, 2007, the Fed 
created the Term Auction Facility (TAF) program, extending borrowing conditions for a 
term of 28 to 35 days. Over the next months, the Fed’s target interest rate was lowered 
by 325 basis points and the TAF funding program was extended, including a new series 
of term repurchase transactions worth $100 billion (Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2009).  
However, and even though the regulatory actions were apparently successful in 
stabilizing the financial system after the first shock in the ABCP market, a number of 
money market funds suffered substantial losses on September, 2008, following the 
Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy (Brunnermeier, 2008). Lehman was the fourth largest 
investment bank in the United States and a global financial services firm that had placed 
large sums in the subprime and other securitized sectors. The effects of Lehman’s 
bankruptcy, in September 15, promptly affected the financial and interbank markets 
(Gorton and Metrick, 2012), causing severe disruptions in the investment bank’s 
counterparties. When the Reserve Primary Fund, one of the largest money market funds 
in the US, announced to third-party investors that it had suffered losses on its $785 
million of Lehman’s commercial paper, the situation in the interbank market worsened 
again. After the Reserve Primary Fund’s announcement on 16 September, withdrawal 
requests extended to large money market funds with commercial paper holdings 
(Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2009). 
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4. The Asset-backed Commercial Paper Market 
4.1  Asset-backed Commercial Paper 
 
Historically, commercial paper was a form of unsecured and highly liquid short-term 
debt reserved to large, credit worthiness corporations, with sound balance sheets and 
important flows of funds (Calomiris et. al., 1995). Maturities normally range up to 270 
days, although typical issuances are set at an average of 60 days. As one of the cheapest 
sources of external financing for companies, commercial paper provides for an 
alternative mechanism to classical bank lending, representing about one-sixth of total 
US bank loans in 2002 (Shen, 2002).  
During the 1980s, the market for commercial paper promissory notes grew up to five 
times its size, following the heavy activity in mergers and acquisitions and the 
developments in the swaps market and money market fund industry. Commercial paper 
issuances were extended to smaller US corporations, foreign firms and foreign financial 
institutions, while traditional borrowers strengthened their investment positions. Also, 
ABCP emerged as a new form of asset securitization. Banks, as they became 
increasingly familiarized with structured products, saw an opportunity to expand their 
financing alternatives and those of their clients, guaranteeing a fee income through 
potential participants in their programs. They started transferring their assets to a special 
purpose vehicle, or ABCP conduit, easing regulatory pressures over minimum capital 
requirements, whereas maintaining customer relationships by continuing to service the 
receivables (Post et al., 1992).  
After 2004, changes in the US banking regulation came to exclude assets in off-balance 
sheet vehicles from risk-weighted calculations. In Europe, following the adoption of the 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), asset transfers to SPVs should not 
be recognized as a true sale; however, the majority of regulators did not change capital 
requirements in conformity with the directive. By placing assets in off-balance sheet 
conduits, banks benefited from regulatory arbitrage and were thus able to undertake 
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significant high risks without holding capital against its investments (Acharya et al., 
2013). 
ABCP conduits are special purpose vehicles established by sponsoring financial 
institutions (administrators) with the objective of funding a portfolio of assets through 
the issuance of asset-backed commercial paper. They bring together borrowers and 
lenders, facilitating the flow of funds between corporations and third-party investors, 
and function as stand-alone and bankruptcy remote entities. In fact, and although the 
sponsors often provide administrative services, credit and liquidity enhancement to the 
ABCP conduit, they do not own the SPV (Bens and Monahan, 2008). With no 
statements consolidated under the sponsoring firm, conduits are designed to acquire 
large pools of receivables from one or several asset originators, using the proceeds from 
commercial paper issuance to finance their purchases.  
ABCP sold to institutional investors is thus commercial paper guaranteed by the asset 
pool owned by the conduit and is simultaneously the central source of funding for the 
off-balance sheet vehicle. Assets financed with ABCP generally have a 3 to 5-year 
maturity and include trade receivables, collateralized debt obligations, asset-backed and 
mortgage-backed securities, auto and equipment loans and leases, corporate and 
government bonds and commercial paper issued by other entities (Fitch Ratings, 2001). 
Because conduits essentially finance these assets with asset-backed commercial paper 
limited to a tenor of 30 days, they are dependent on their ability of rolling-over ABCP 
to pay-off maturing liabilities. As in what happens with traditional banks, conduits 
exhibit a significant maturity mismatch, as they primarily utilize short-term debt notes 
to purchase long-term assets from the originating companies (Acharya and Richardson, 
2009).  
In addition to new ABCP sales, funding sources for conduits can also include the 
collection of receivables on the financial assets held by the SPV, or the use of 
guarantees provided by the sponsoring firm. Sponsors are typically very large 
commercial banks, based in the United States and Europe, that grant administrative 
services and explicit guarantees to the conduit, in exchange for a contracted fee. 
Conduits with full credit support are 100 percent backed with credit guarantees and will 
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require the sponsor to pay off maturing ABCP in the event of a default. Because they 
are practically equivalent to on-balance sheet financing, exposing sponsoring firms to 
very high risks, they are usually not utilized by banks in need to reduce their capital 
requirements. Liquidity guarantees are the most used by commercial banks and, 
although they do not cover conduit assets’ defaults, they are structured to pay off 
maturing ABCP and, therefore, to prevent those situations. Extendible notes and SIV 
guarantees – arranged via structure investment vehicles – are the two weakest forms of 
protection, respectively allowing conduits to extend maturing commercial paper and 
uninsured debt for a defined period of time (Acharya et al., 2013).  
During the 2007 run, the combined set of guarantees restrained losses for outside 
investors in the ABCP market, with sponsoring institutions concentrating the full risks 
of commercial paper issuances on their balance sheets. Specifically for liquidity and 
credit enhancement, sponsors were forced to purchase the underlying assets held in 
conduits, directly delivering cash to the SPV. In fact, as long as the sponsoring 
institution was kept solvent, ABCP represented a risk-free instrument for outside 
investors in the financial markets, as it was jointly backed by conduit assets and 
insurance guarantees provided by the sponsor (Acharya and Schnabl, 2010). 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic structure of an asset-backed commercial paper conduit.  
 
Figure 1. ABCP conduit structure  
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ABCP conduits are set by sponsors, or administrators, that offer management services 
and insurance guarantees to the special purpose vehicles, assuming most of its economic 
risks and rewards. Conduits, as stand-alone, bankruptcy remote entities, purchase large 
pools of receivables from one or several asset originators and fund acquisitions by 
selling unsecured promissory debt notes to third-party investors. Separate roles for 
sponsors and asset originators typically indicate situations where conduits are 
established for benefiting the sponsors’ clients, providing them with alternative funding 
mechanisms. Because conduits purchase assets from different sellers, the structure is 
referred to as a multi-seller conduit program. ABCP program structures can also be 
classified as single-seller, if the sponsor is the asset originator and intends to establish a 
new source of financing for its business activity, or as securities-backed, when the 
sponsor invests in asset-backed, mortgage-backed or corporate securities for regulatory 
arbitrage purposes. This is normally the case for banking institutions subjected to strict 
capital requirements, which intend to lower their capital ratios by placing assets in off-
balance sheet vehicles.  Finally, hybrid structures may incorporate elements of both 
multi-seller and securities-backed formats, covering the funding needs of ABCP 
administrators and those of its clients (Moody’s Investors Service, 2003). 
Asset-backed commercial paper was largely important in the years preceding the global 
financial crisis and had played a fundamental role on the debt run that started in the 
summer of 2007. As a central funding mechanism for structured investment vehicles 
(Shleifer, 2010) and private-label assets in the US, it was the largest short-term debt 
instrument in the shadow banking system, significantly exceeding the size of repo 
transactions and other sources of financing for securitization activities (Krishnamurthy 
et al., 2014). Institutional investors ran on ABCP starting August 9, following the 
announcement of BNP Paribas which suspended withdrawals on three of its investment 
funds. The severe stoppages in ABCP refinancing brought very negative effects on 
conduits, in need to roll-over their short-term liabilities, and on sponsoring institutions, 
that were offering explicit guarantees to the off-balance sheet vehicles (Covitz et al., 
2009). Runs for other short-term debt instruments initiated after the turmoil in the 
ABCP market had already unfolded, respectively on September 2007, for sale and 
repurchase agreements, and on September 2008, for money market funds (Schroth et al., 
2014). 
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Figure 2. ABCP outstandings as of January 1, 2007 
Conduit data is from Moody’s Investors Service Quarterly Spreadsheets and is stated in thousands of 
dollars. US ABCP is ABCP issued in the US market and Other ABCP is ABCP issued in Europe, 
Australia, Canada, Japan and South Africa.  
 
 
As shown in figure 2, values for US and global ABCP outstanding fell by nearly 40 
percent, from June 2007 until December 2008, reflecting investors’ growing lack of 
confidence in the market and their increasing reluctance in rolling over maturing 
commercial paper. After a period of long exponential growth, marked by important 
changes in banking regulation, global ABCP peaked at 1395 billion dollars in mid-
2007. Commercial banks, sponsoring roughly 75 percent of conduit vehicles 
(Kacperczyk and Schnabl, 2009), had then significant advantages in placing assets in 
off-balance sheet entities, reducing or maintaining their capital ratios for higher risks. In 
the United States, the largest market for ABCP issuance, total outstanding reached 1073 
billion dollars in 2007 and contracted by over 230 billion from June to December that 
year. Other ABCP refers to asset-backed commercial paper issued in Europe, Australia, 
Canada, Japan and South Africa and represents a relatively small part of total 
investment in ABCP, when compared with total outstanding for the global market. 
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4.2  The Investment in the US ABCP Market and the US dollar shortage 
 
During recent decades, and until the onset of the financial crisis in 2007, global banks 
were expanding their international activities, increasing cross-border lending and their 
“appetite for foreign assets”. Banking had become progressively more globalized, 
bolstered by the growth on structured products, hedge fund industry and the spread of 
universal banking, with total foreign claims reaching 31 trillion dollars in 2007. After 
year 2000, the growth on cross-border positions was particularly high for European 
banks, primarily investing in dollars, in the United States (McGuire and Von Peter, 
2009). At the time, US interest rates were higher than those of the European countries 
and banks in Europe exhibited a significant home-bias in their equity investments. Also, 
the inadequacy of regulatory capital requirements and the growth of asset-backed 
securitization favored the investment in structured products, essentially in the mortgage 
real estate market (Bernanke et al., 2011). 
In the early stages of the financial crisis, US dollar-denominated holdings for European 
global banks were comparable, in size, to the total assets in the US commercial banking 
sector (Shin, 2012) and represented, for some European banking systems, more than 
half of the increase in the overall foreign investment since end-2000 (McGuire and Von 
Peter, 2009). In a period that followed the introduction of the common-currency, 
facilitating the intra-euro area trading, the growth in US dollar-denominated claims was, 
in fact, quite remarkable. Global banks, however, hedged their currency exposure by 
issuing debt in US dollars, and masked their gross positions by netting out total assets 
and liabilities (Shin, 2012). Funding was mainly provided via very short-term debt 
instruments, with securitized asset-backed commercial paper programs accounting for 
the largest share on total debt issuances. Until year 2007, commercial paper was the 
most important source of short-term financing in the US market and ABCP was the 
primary type of funding for short-term institutional borrowers (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 
2012). 
Table 1 shows ABCP holdings by country, for all commercial bank sponsors, as of 
January 1, 2007. 
 23 
 
Table 1. ABCP holdings by country of origin as of January 1, 2007 
Conduit data is from Moody’s Investors Service Quarterly Spreadsheets, US ABCP is ABCP issued in the 
US market and Other ABCP is ABCP issued in Europe, Australia, Canada, Japan and South Africa. The 
sample is restricted to commercial bank sponsors. Values are stated in thousands of dollars. 
 
Country  US ABCP 
 
Other ABCP ABCP Outstanding 
Belgium                21 391 570  
 
13 809 500                         35 201 070  
Denmark                  1 795 900  
 
-                             1 795 900  
France                50 201 110  
 
30 346 920                         80 548 030  
Germany                52 064 790  
 
24 895 190                         76 959 980  
Italy                19 176 580  
 
4 450 130                         23 626 710  
Netherlands                63 615 220  
 
31 376 490                         94 991 710  
Spain                  2 126 820  
 
4 210 850                           6 337 670  
Sweden                  1 718 760  
 
352 900                           2 071 660  
Switzerland                  4 475 320  
 
-                             4 475 320  
United Kingdom              118 675 460  
 
13 093 640                       131 769 100  
Europe              335 241 530  
 
122 535 620                       457 777 150  
United States              216 440 000  
 
229 533 640                       445 973 640  
Other                52 402 960  
 
29 150 000                         81 552 960  
Total              604 084 490  
 
381 219 260                       985 303 750  
 
ABCP issued in dollars, in the United States market, represented over 60 percent of 
total commercial paper outstanding, although the majority of ABCP exposure was 
concentrated amongst foreign commercial banks, mainly located in Europe. European 
commercial banks were the largest administrators of conduit vehicles in the ABCP 
market, sponsoring nearly 458 billion dollars in early 2007. United Kingdom, 
Netherlands France and Germany were the four top European countries in terms of 
ABCP exposure, mainly investing in the US dollar market via ABCP conduits. 
Globally, European commercial banks sponsored 335 billion dollars in the US market, 
compared with the $216 billion outstanding for US domestic banks.  
When in the summer of 2007 the turmoil in the ABCP market unfolded, reflecting 
investors’ concerns regarding the “overall quality of the assets backing commercial 
paper issuances”, (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012), banking institutions with higher 
conduit exposure were suffering the most negative effects from the first run on ABCP 
(Acharya et al., 2013). However, European banks that were guaranteeing conduits’ 
investment in US dollars were subjected to severe liquidity shortages, higher than those 
encountered by US sponsoring banks in the sector (Shin, 2012). In fact, conduits 
established by European bank sponsors, although they hedged their US long positions 
by issuing short-term dollar liabilities, were facing additional exposure to US asset-
backed securities (Kamin and De Marco, 2012). 
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Given their reliance on short-term dollar funding, foreign bank sponsors were 
vulnerable to important currency mismatches, as they had to provide liquidity in non-
domestic currency, if their funding positions could not be rolled-over (Broz, 2012). At 
the start of the financial crisis, when banks were forced to secure alternative funding 
sources to offset losses on conduit activity, European and other foreign bank sponsors 
investing in the United States substantially increased their demand for US dollar 
funding (Acharya and Schnabl, 2010).  
Differently from banks headquartered in the United States, which had direct access to 
US domestic deposits and to the Federal Home Bank Loans system (Acharya et al., 
2013), foreign banks had to try to raise liquidity in the dollar-denominated wholesales 
market or by accessing local deposits and exchanging them into US dollars. However, 
after the onset of the financial crisis in August, 2007, the tightening credit conditions 
led to “severe disruptions in the interbank and foreign exchange swaps markets” 
(McGuire and Von Peter, 2009) causing foreign and particularly European banks to not 
increase dollar funding by as much as they needed (Bernanke, 2010).  
European banks sponsoring conduits in the US market, as they were the most exposed 
to dollar liquidity shortages from the beginning of the ABCP freeze, played a very 
important role in the rapid unfolding of the global financial crisis (Shin, 2012). The 
decision to establish conduit vehicles that incorporated recourse to banking institutions’ 
balance sheets was contrary to the risk-spreading objective of conventional 
securitization mechanisms and, combined with asymmetries in terms of funding for 
domestic and foreign banks, significantly increased risk-taking for European banks 
sponsoring conduit vehicles in the US ABCP market. After December 12, 2007, they 
were able to borrow from the Term Auction Facility and Central Bank Liquidity Swap 
Lines established by the Federal Reserve (Acharya et al., 2013).  
Foreign banks with branches in the United States could also make use of the Federal 
Reserve’s Discount Window program, as it provided financing to all solvent banking 
institutions with pledgeable US assets. However, because of the stigma associated with 
the Discount Window use, very few banks accessed the government facility (Armantier 
et al., 2010). 
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5. The Federal Reserve as a global lender of last resort 
 
When on December 1, 2010, following the early implementation of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, the Federal Reserve was forced to 
release detailed information on the programs used to respond to the recent financial 
crisis, the disclosures revealed the extension of the Fed’s aid to foreign banks, outside 
the US. 
 The Federal Reserve, in its function of guaranteeing economic stability across domestic 
financial markets, should supervise the operations of US and foreign banks with 
branches in the country and serve as lender of last resort, should the supply of liquidity 
be inadequate to meet the credit needs for the banking system (Broz, 2012). The lender 
of last resort function, with commercial banks borrowing directly from the Fed at a 
primary (discount) lending rate or using the liquidity facilities made available by 
governmental officials, is a key regulatory mechanism for the country’s central bank, 
when the interbank market can no longer provide liquidity to solvent banks in need for 
credit (Armantier et al., 2010).  
During the 2007-2009 global financial crisis, what happened was that foreign, and 
particularly European banks, were amongst the largest beneficiaries of the special 
emergency programs established by the Fed during and after the summer of 2007 (Broz, 
2012). European banks, as a result of the increasing globalization in financial markets, 
had heavily invested in dollar-denominated assets, funding their purchases via US short-
term debt, especially in the asset-backed commercial paper market (Cetorelli and 
Goldberg, 2012).  
In the aftermath of the ABCP shock, foreign banks, other than suffering losses related to 
conduit’s activity maturity mismatches, were also at risk that their dollar-denominated 
funding positions could not be rolled over. Whereas for US-located banks there were 
available secure governmental long-term financing sources, European banks were 
facing higher liquidity pressures, as they had to rely on very short-term or demandable 
types of funding. In response to such liquidity shortfalls, and actively trying to protect 
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the US domestic markets, the Federal Reserve made available a set of emergency 
lending facilities in order to reduce dollar funding pressures for both the US and foreign 
banking institutions. Dollar funding shortages for foreign banks investing in the United 
States did not only affected banks’ balance sheets and solvency ratios, but might also 
have adverse effects in the US real economy, especially for US firms directly borrowing 
from foreign banks (Acharya et al., 2013). 
In the early stages of the global financial crisis, prior to the US implementation of 
liquidity and credit facilities, central banks around the world began to make use of the 
classic monetary policy tools, influencing money supply by altering lending rates in the 
financial system (Wu, 2008).  
For the United States Federal government, the seven cuts in the target Fed funds rate, 
totaling 325 basis points, from September, 2007, to May, 2008, accompanied the 
reductions in the cost of the Discount Window borrowing. Starting on August 17, 2007, 
the term of discount loans increased from overnight to 30 and then to 90 days and the 
primary (discount) lending rate – at which the Fed lends to eligible depositary 
institutions – was cut from 100 to 50 and finally 25 basis points above the federal funds 
rate (Cecchetti, 2009). 
The Discount Window facility is a last-resort funding mechanism for depositary 
institutions with pledgeable US assets, that do not have any other means of access to 
credit. During market disruptions, when interbank lending becomes insufficient to meet 
private liquidity needs, banks can resort to Discount Window loans, as long as they can 
satisfy the Fed that they do not have any other funding alternatives available. Therefore, 
if market participants became aware that certain depositary institutions had access to the 
Fed’s facility, they could interpret the recourse to funding as an indicator of financial 
weakness (Armantier et al., 2010). Banks, in the presence of this Discount Window 
stigma, and despite of the Federal Reserve’s measures to enhance liquidity, were highly 
reluctant to increase their borrowings from the Fed, during the financial crisis period 
(Bernanke, 2009a). 
By year-end 2007, when it became clear that the use of traditional monetary and 
Discount Window tools was being insufficient in improving the overall economic 
 27 
 
conditions, the Federal Reserve introduced a number of less conventional actions in 
order to address financial distress (Bernanke, 2009b).  
As shown in figure 3, values for the spread between 3-month Libor and 3-month 
expected federal funds rate (TED spread), an indicator of the perceived credit risk in the 
overall economy
3
, remained relatively high until December 2007. 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of the TED rate as of January 2007  
Data is from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
 
The establishment of the Term Auction Facility (TAF), on December 12, by ensuring 
perfect anonymity to all borrowing participants in the program, provided a satisfactory 
alternative to discount window lending (Cecchetti, 2009). Through the TAF procedures, 
between December 17, 2007, and March, 8, 2010, the Fed conducted a total of 60 
auctions roughly every two weeks, allowing depositary institutions in sound financial 
condition to raise funding for terms of 28 and 84 days, with a few exceptions. Initially, 
the amount of credit available was set at $20 billion, but at the height of the financial 
                                                          
3 The TED spread, by representing the difference between the interest rate on interbank lending and the 
interest rate on the short-term US government debt, can be used as a measure of the perceived credit risk 
in the economy. 
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crisis, total funding extended up until 150 billion dollars per auction (Armantier et al., 
2010). Differently from discount window borrowing, where the lending cost is 
previously fixed by the Fed, the TAF interest rate was set through a competitive auction 
mechanism, in which the minimum bid was determined via expected federal funds rate 
over the auction term. Beginning with the highest offered interest rate, funds were 
allocated at a maximum of 10 percent for each borrowing participant and were credited 
to the winning bidders 2 days after the date of the auction. Importantly, all loans were 
fully collateralized “by at least a factor of two”, although the Fed admitted as eligible 
collateral a wide range of assets with little market value. As what happened for all other 
lending facilities established by the Federal Reserve, TAF loans did not increase risk for 
the Fed, nor did they augmented the size of its balance sheet, as they implied a decrease 
in outright securities holdings, in equal proportion (Cecchetti, 2009). 
At the same time, and in the view of further extending the international reach of the 
Term Auction Facility program, the US Federal Reserve set up bilateral currency swap 
agreements with other country’s central banks (Bordo et al., 2012). Collectively, until 
February 1, 2010, the Fed transferred over half a trillion dollars to fourteen foreign 
central banks with significant dollar-denominated exposure. Transactions functioned as 
general liquidity swaps, in which central banks, by paying a determined fee, were able 
to acquire a given amount of dollars from the Fed, exchanging it for the equivalent 
value in their currency. Central Banks were then responsible for lending the total dollar 
amount to banking institutions in their jurisdictions, assuming the full credit risk on loan 
repayment. The transaction would be closed at maturity, when central banks returned 
the dollar amount and received the value in their domestic currency, considering the 
previous established exchange rate (Broz, 2012). 
Dollar swap agreements were particularly important for the European Central Bank, the 
Bank of England and the Swiss National Bank, which took over about 80, 9 and 5 
percent, respectively, of the total amount drawn through the program. In fact, 
arrangements established under the Liquidity Swap Lines facility were set up with 
central banks in countries of especial relevance to the US economy, generally regular 
trading partners or global financial centres (Broz, 2012). Figure 4 illustrates the large 
differences between dollar amounts extended to foreign central banks, between 
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December 17, 2007 and July 13, 2010, under the bilateral currency swap agreements set 
up by the Federal Reserve. 
Figure 4. Dollar amount extended to foreign Central Banks under the Bilateral Currency Swap 
agreements   
Data on the Bilateral Currency Swap agreements is for the period between December 17, 2007, and July 
13, 2010 and is taken from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. 
Values are stated in millions of dollars. 
 
 
From early December, 2007, until the end of February, the following year, values for 
the TED spread (on figure 3) reduced by over 100 basis points, suggesting that the 
Federal Reserve’s facilities were effective in stabilizing the interbank market. However, 
stress increased again in March, 2008, at the time of the new run on Bear Stearns 
investment bank. As liquidity in the market for repo transactions dried up and “US 
Treasury securities of all varieties became extremely scarce”, the Federal Reserve 
created, on March 11, that year, the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) 
(Cecchetti, 2009). Through the TSFL, the Fed’s primary dealers, including non-
depositary institutions, were able to obtain US treasury securities by delivering highly-
rated residential MBS and private-label ABS as collateral (Wu, 2008). Also on mid-
March, 2008, at the peak of the Bear Stearns crisis, the Fed introduced the Primary 
Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), enabling the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to 
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grant overnight loans on a collateralized basis to its primary dealers (Adrian et al., 
2009). 
Later, in September, 2008, following the bankruptcy of Leman Brothers and the 
subsequent run on money market funds, the Fed implemented the Asset-Backed 
Commercial Paper Money Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), with the objective 
of increasing liquidity in the ABCP market and in the money market mutual fund 
industry (Duygan-Bump et al., 2013). Furthermore, and after October 7, 2008, 
commercial paper issuers could make use of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility 
(CPFF), established by the Fed as a backstop liquidity instrument that allowed issuing 
firms to roll over their maturing liabilities (Adrian et al., 2009). 
Finally, the Federal Reserve addressed the problems in securitization markets by 
creating the Term Asset-Backed Loan Facility (TALF) on 25
th
 November, 2008. The 
program started operations in March, the next year, and was designed to support the 
issuance of asset backed securities’ issuances, collateralized by consumer and small 
business loans (Campbell et al., 2011). 
  
 31 
 
6. Empirical Analysis 
 
6.1   Stock return performance of European bank sponsors backing conduits’ 
investment in the US 
6.1.1 Data and summary statistics 
 
We use three different sources of data in order to analyze the effect of currency 
mismatches on banking stock returns, focusing on European banks that were 
guaranteeing ABCP conduits’ investment in the US, in the early stages of the global 
financial crisis. 
We collect quarterly data on all asset-backed commercial paper conduits, from 2001 
until 2010, using ABCP Program Index spreadsheets from Moody’s Investors Service, 
which summarize basic information on conduit programs. Data includes conduit name 
and administrator, authorized amount to be issued, average commercial paper 
outstandings per quarter (for the US and other markets) and information on asset type
4
, 
program type
5
, conduit support
6
 and rating assigned by Moody’s. 
Data specifications follow the work of Acharya et al. (2013). We construct our main 
dataset using Moody’s quarterly data on all commercial banks located in the United 
States and Europe. For each quarter, we merge all conduit observations under the same 
sponsoring institution, distinguishing between total commercial paper issuances in the 
United States and in other markets, such as Europe, Australia, South Africa, Canada and 
Japan. When more than one entity is listed as the program administrator, we consider 
the first entity listed as the sponsoring firm, as it is indicated in Moody's ABCP 
Program Index.  
                                                          
4
 Assets in which the ABCP conduit invests in: asset-backed securities, commercial mortgages, corporate 
loans, credit card receivables, credit default swaps. 
5
 ABCP program structure: multiseller, single-seller, securities-backed or hybrid structures. 
6 
Indicates whether the conduit is 100% backed by credit guarantees (fully supported) or partially 
supported. 
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We use Bankscope in order to identify whether the sponsor is a commercial bank or 
other type of banking institution defined in the database: investment bank, specialized 
governmental credit institution, real estate and mortgage bank, finance company, etc. If 
we cannot find a match on Bankscope, i.e. if the sponsoring firm is not a banking 
institution, we conduct an internet search. We find that, other than commercial banks, 
sponsors on ABCP programs are typically structured finance companies, mortgage 
originators or asset and investment managers. We use firms’ annual reports and online 
available firm information to identify the parent company associated to each conduit 
sponsor. We aggregate commercial banks at the level of the consolidated holding 
financial company (e.g., Citigroup consolidates conduit data on Citibank NA, Citibank 
(South Dakota) NA and Citibank International Plc). 
We use Bankscope to construct a new dataset on all commercial banks based in the 
United States and Europe, with more than 10 billion dollars in total assets. Introducing 
smaller banks in the sample would have significantly biased the results, precisely 
because they do not have the financial strength to sponsor conduit vehicles. We drop 
banks that do not have available information during the period and overcome double 
counting issues, by considering only consolidated financial statements on Bankscope
7
. 
Also, we identify the parent financial company for all commercial banks in the sample, 
at the beginning of 2007. If the consolidated parent company and its subsidiaries have 
more than one entry on Bankscope dataset, we keep only the parent company. We use 
the International Securities Identification Number (ISIN) provided on Bankscope, to 
match commercial bank data to equity returns on Datastream. We collect stock return 
index data for all banking institutions with available share price information in year 
2007.  
                                                          
7
 As explained in Duprey and LÉ (2014), the Bankscope database provides company financial statements 
for a large set of banking institutions, in both consolidated and unconsolidated forms. Hence, for a given 
bank, the available consolidated financial statement integrates balance sheet information on its affiliates 
or subsidiaries. In order to avoid double counting issues, it is necessary for the database user to choose 
between consolidated and unconsolidated financial statements, depending on his research question. 
Further double counting problems may appear in cases where both main and additional statements (as 
referred by the consolidation codes C* or U*) are available and the user should choose between using one 
of the two options. Also, and because Bankscope consolidation codes do not provide information on bank 
ownership structure, i.e. they do not distinguish between consolidated statements of a parent company 
and consolidated statements of a subsidiary bank, it is necessary to determine the evolution of 
parent/subsidiary relations at the time of the analysis. 
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Table 2. The twelve largest conduit sponsors as of January 1, 2007  
Conduit data is from Moody’s Investors Service Quarterly Spreadsheets, US ABCP is ABCP issued in the 
US market and Other ABCP is ABCP issued in Europe, Australia, Canada, Japan and South Africa. 
Asset-backed commercial paper is stated in thousands of dollars. 
  
Table 2 shows the twelve largest conduit sponsors, as of January 1, 2007. Citigroup, the 
parent holding company for Citibank NA, Citibank (South Dakota) NA and Citibank 
International Plc, was the largest ABCP administrator in the market, sponsoring over 
92.67 billion dollars in commercial paper. Of the twelve conduit sponsors on table 2, 
only two of them are non-banking institutions and one is not operating in the 
commercial banking sector – Rabobank. There are nine commercial banks 
administrating ABCP conduit vehicles, six of which are based in European countries.  
Overall, conduit vehicles sponsored by European commercial banks invested primarily 
in US ABCP, for an aggregate value outstanding of 335.24 billion dollars. On average, 
they were amongst the foreign banking institutions with larger exposure to US conduit 
vehicles, measured by the 73 percent ratio between US ABCP and total ABCP 
outstanding. Particularly during the pre-crisis period, European global banks had 
substantially increased their US dollar holdings, funding their positions in the dollar-
denominated short-term debt market. United Kingdom, Netherlands and Germany were 
the three top European countries in terms of total ABCP investment by commercial 
banks in the US market, together exceeding the 216.44 billion dollars of US ABCP 
outstanding for American domestic banks in the commercial banking sector. 
Administrator Country 
 
US ABCP 
 
Other ABCP ABCP Outstanding 
Citigroup United States 
 
86 328 510 
 
6 342 930 92 671 440 
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. Netherlands 
 
51 887 200 
 
16 686 910 68 574 110 
The Liberty Hampshire Company, LLC United States 
 
48 239 000 
 
0 48 239 000 
Bank of America, N.A. United States 
 
45 548 890 
 
141 670 45 690 560 
HBOS Plc United Kingdom 
 
28 645 640 
 
15 254 380 43 900 020 
Societe Generale France 
 
31 201 520 
 
12 293 510 43 495 030 
JPMorgan Chase Bank United States 
 
36 103 900 
 
6 609 040 42 712 940 
HSBC Holdings Plc United Kingdom 
 
29 636 180 
 
9 789 450 39 425 630 
Deutsche Bank AG Germany 
 
23 341 860 
 
15 394 200 38 736 060 
BSN Holdings Limited United Kingdom 
 
29 888 000 
 
6 684 040 36 572 040 
Barclays PLC United Kingdom 
 
33 070 000 
 
381 510 33 451 510 
Rabobank  Netherlands 
 
28 107 590 
 
2 665 560 30 773 150 
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6.1.2 Methodology 
 
This subsection analyzes whether European commercial banks sponsoring conduits’ 
investment in the United States had experienced the lowest stock returns in the early-
stages of the global financial crisis. European bank sponsors were, as well as all other 
conduit administrators, greatly exposed to large maturity mismatches, but faced 
additional exposure to US asset-backed securities, by financing their ABCP vehicles in 
non-domestic currency. Arguably, in the beginning of the financial crisis, European 
banks investing in US commercial paper SPVs were subjected to the most severe 
liquidity shortages, as they had increased difficulties in rolling-over their dollar funding 
positions.  Differently from banks in the United States, that were able to tap into 
alternative stable funding sources, European banking institutions had to raise liquidity 
in the dollar wholesales market or by accessing local European deposits and swap them 
into US dollars. 
We used equity cumulative returns as an indicator of banking performance at the onset 
of the financial crisis. As defined in the Datastream database, equity returns – expressed 
through the total return index, RI – represent the theoretical aggregate growth in the 
value of a share over a specific period of time, assuming that dividends are reinvested to 
purchase additional units of equity at the closing price applicable on the ex-dividend 
date.  
We follow the model specifications in Acharya et al. (2013), considering cumulative 
stock returns over the narrow 3-day window period from August 8 to August 10, 2007. 
Restricting the analysis to such a short window event has the objective of isolating the 
effects of US commercial paper sponsorship on the stock returns of European banks. As 
argued by the authors, during the financial crisis, there were other variables affecting 
banking performance, some of which correlated with conduit sponsorship. August 9, 
2007, the day of BNP Paribas’ announcement that suspended withdrawals on three of its 
investment funds, marked the start of the crisis in the ABCP market and, for that, it 
provides a good setting for identifying the impacts of currency mismatches on stock 
returns. 
 35 
 
Our sample is restricted to the group of all commercial banks located in the United 
States and Europe, with more than 10 billion dollars in total assets and share price data 
available, as of January 1, 2007. We estimate the following linear regression model, 
controlling for differences in bank observable characteristics: 
                    
where    is the cumulative equity return of bank   during the period from August 8 to 
August 10, 2007, and    is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank   is an European 
banking institution sponsoring conduits’ investment in the US market, and 0, otherwise. 
   are bank  ’s observable characteristics, as of January 1, 2007– bank size, return on 
assets, share of assets funded with short-term debt and share of assets funded with 
deposits – and    represents the bank specific error term. 
Because stock returns on Datastream are expressed as an index, computing the 
cumulative returns implies, at first, to obtain the actual daily returns – the percentage 
calculation of the differences per day of the   . We calculate, for each day and banking 
institution: 
             
             
       
  
The cumulative return is computed using the formula:  
                                                         
In addition to estimating the effect of currency mismatches on bank stock returns from 
August 8 to August 10, we focus on that same exact relation for the previous months of 
2007. Doing so, we ensure that the effect was not driven by the banks’ normal activity, 
but was instead caused by the higher liquidity shock for European sponsors in the US 
ABCP market. 
Following Acharya et al. (2013), we estimate the baseline specification using 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
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6.1.3 Results 
 
Table 3. Banking stock return performance 
This table analyzes stock return performance of commercial banks in the United States and Europe, separating 
between European banks sponsoring conduit vehicles in the US and all other banking institutions. 
The dependent variable, “Stock return”, is the cumulative equity return for individual banks, between August 8 
and August 10, 2007, calculated using the Return Index on Datastream.  
“Dummy” is a binary variable that distinguishes European bank sponsors backing ABCP investment in the US 
from all other commercial banks in the United States and Europe.  
Control variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
The sample is restricted to all commercial banks located in the United States and Europe with more than 10 
billion dollars in total assets and that have share price data available.  
We report heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** define 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance. 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Stock return (percent) 
 
Event Regressions 
 
Placebo Regressions 
 
August 8 -10 August 8 - 10 August 
 
January February March April  May June July 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Dummy -0.020*** -0.018** -0.026* 
 
0.015 0.005 0.027 0.045 0.002 0.016 0.040* 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) 
 
(0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.038) (0.909) (0.013) (0.022) 
Log (Assets) 
 
-0.057** -0.082** 
 
0.020 -0.001 -0.033 0.044 -0.011 -0.032 -0.029 
  
(0.022) (0.038) 
 
(0.043) (0.026) (0.039) (0.044) (0.044) (0.033) (0.048) 
Log (Equity) 
 
-0.056** 0.102*** 
 
-0.039 -0.017 0.014 -0.040 -0.008 0.020 -0.013 
  
(0.022) (0.038) 
 
(0.046) (0.028) (0.039) (0.043) (0.045) (0.032) (0.051) 
Return on assets 
 
-2.148*** -2.195* 
 
2.337 1.599 -0.411 1.265 1.484 0.581 3.397 
  
(0.784) (1.176) 
 
(1.596) (1.001) (1.355) (1.381) (1.275) (1.137) (1.983) 
Share short-term debt 
 
0.053 0.059 
 
0.006 0.011 0.072 -0.394 0.177 -0.040 0.011 
  
(0.048) (0.104) 
 
(0.101) (0.104) (0.101) (0.185) (0.080) (0.062) (0.114) 
Share deposits 
 
-0.010 -0.030 
 
0.001 -0.005 -0.015 -0.214 -0.021 0.008 0.036 
  
(0.024) (0.043) 
 
(0.059) (0.044) (0.042) (0.087) (0.038) (0.035) (0.059) 
No. of observations 88 88 88 
 
88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
R-squared 0.079 0.219 0.141 
 
0.054 0.100 0.030 0.176 0.115 0.072 0.168 
 
Table 3 presents the results. Column 1 shows that the dummy variable, which 
distinguishes European bank sponsors backing ABCP investment in the US from all 
other banking institutions in the sample, is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
On average, the model indicates that the 3-day cumulative return for European banks 
sponsoring conduit vehicles in the United States was 0.02 percentage points lower than 
the stock return for all the remaining institutions. On column 2, we control for bank 
specific characteristics adding bank size – using the natural logarithm of assets and the 
natural logarithm of equity – return on assets and controls for funding types, including 
in our regression the share of assets funded with short-term debt and share of assets 
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funded with deposits. The coefficient of the dummy variable remains at the 0.02 
percentage points and is statistically significant, now at the 5 percent level. 
We interpret these results as evidence that European banks sponsoring conduit vehicles 
in the United States were the most affected by the ABCP turmoil since the beginning of 
the financial crisis. However, and as in Acharya et al. (2013), we argue that the 
coefficient is most likely to be a conservative estimate of the effects of the early 
downturn, because investors, responsible for influencing price expectations in the 
market, could not have quite comprehended the full impact of the ABCP crisis. Also, 
and considering the relative opaqueness of credit and liquidity guarantees provided to 
conduit activity, market participants might not have immediately understood that 
conduit losses would be transferred back onto sponsoring institutions’ balance sheets.  
Additionally, we estimate the same baseline specification for both August, on column 3, 
and the previous months of 2007, on columns 4 to 10. We encounter a negative 
statistical significance at the 10 percent level for our dummy variable and a coefficient 
of 0,028 percentage points, larger than the estimated for the three-day window period. 
However, and despite the results appear to indicate that the lag between cumulative 
returns of European banks sponsoring conduit vehicles in the U.S and all other 
commercial banks in the United States and Europe was higher for the month of August, 
we should note that a longer event window may include other factors as confounding 
effects. Finally, for the months prior to August 2007, we find no statistical significance 
for our dummy variable, except for July (where the coefficient is statistical significant at 
the 10 percent level), ensuring that the weaker performance of European bank sponsors 
backing ABCP investment in the US was in fact driven by currency mismatches in 
conduit activity. 
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6.2  Bank sponsors and the Term Auction Facility Program 
6.2.1 Data and summary statistics 
 
In order to test whether European commercial banks sponsoring conduit vehicles in the 
US were the largest beneficiaries of the TAF program, during the period of crisis, we 
use the US government transaction data for regulatory reform
8
.  
Established on December 12, 2007, together with the Credit Swap Lines Liquidity 
Facility, the TAF program offered an alternative lending mechanism for all US and 
foreign banks with branches operating in the United States. When conventional 
monetary policy tools and the discount window borrowing revealed to be insufficient in 
improving overall economic conditions, the two special aid programs were implemented 
by the Fed, as a form of providing liquidity to financial institutions in need. 
Data on the Federal Reserve’s special emergency programs was released on December 
1, 2010, as required by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act. 
For each borrowing institution located in the United States and Europe, we aggregate 
total loan amount for all different auction dates of the TAF lending facility, and use 
bank location to match the borrower name to the banking institution on Bankscope. 
Using the Bankscope database, we identify bank type for each borrowing firm, and 
aggregate commercial banks in the dataset at the level of the parent banking institution. 
In order to do so, we conduct an online internet search, determining the parent financial 
company for all banks in the sample. Finally, we identify the banking institutions 
sponsoring asset-backed commercial paper as of January 1, 2007. 
Table 4 presents basic information on the 12 largest borrowers of the TAF lending 
facility, from the first auction date on December 20, 2007, until March 11, 2010, when 
the program was terminated. 
                                                          
8 Data on all Fed’s liquidity and credit programs is available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_transaction.htm 
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Table 4. The twelve largest borrowers of the Fed’s Term Auction Facility Program  
Data on the TAF lending Program is taken from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. Equity and 
conduit data are from Moody’s Investors Service and Bankscope database, respectively. 
Values are stated in thousands of dollars. 
 
Borrower Country Equity Loan Amount 
Average Loan 
Term 
ABCP 
Outstanding 
Bank of America United States        135 272 000           260 167 000    61,60           45 690 560    
Barclays Plc United Kingdom          53 767 029           227 583 000    42,69           33 451 510    
HBOS Plc United Kingdom     1 161 738 831           173 842 000    56,00           43 900 020    
Wells Fargo & Company United States        481 996 000           146 453 200    48,68                          -      
Wachovia Corporation United States          72 817 000           134 525 000    39,74           13 003 470    
Société Générale France          44 348 743           122 377 200    46,29           43 495 030    
Dresdner Bank AG Germany          22 008 429           112 328 200    41,81           23 190 290    
Citizens Bank United States            3 698 340           110 650 000    39,62                          -      
Citigroup United States        119 783 000           110 349 700    40,92           92 671 440    
Norinchukin Bank Japan          37 789 204           105 010 000    49,00             3 005 000    
Bayerische Landesbank Germany          16 540 235           101 190 000    34,05           22 351 960    
JPMorgan Chase & Co United States     1 351 520 000             97 500 000    52,71           42 712 940    
 
 Of the twelve largest borrowing institutions from the Fed’s TAF lending program, 
represented on table 4, there are ten conduit administrators, sponsoring an aggregate of 
more than 363 billion dollars in ABCP outstanding. Norinchukin Bank and Bayerische 
Landesbank, although they were not operating in the commercial banking sector, were 
also important conduit administrators in early 2007. There are six foreign banks on table 
4, four of which are commercial banks operating in European countries. 
Overall, there were two hundred eighty-three commercial banks, headquartered in the 
United States and Europe, that were borrowing from the Federal Reserve. Of those two 
hundred eighty-two banking institutions, only twenty eight were European banks – 
accessing the TAF loans through their branches in the US – and twenty of them were 
European bank sponsors backing conduits’ investment in the Unite States. However, the 
twenty eight European commercial banks received a total amount of 1 355 billion 
dollars from the US Federal Reserve, and the European bank sponsors, a value of 1 122 
billion dollars, from the aggregate 2 713 billion made available by the TAF program to 
commercial banks in the United State and Europe. 
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6.2.2 Methodology 
 
In this subsection, we analyze whether European commercial banks backing conduits’ 
investment in the US received larger loan amounts through the TAF lending program, 
established by the Federal Reserve. Following Shin (2012), where the author suggests 
that the use of the Term Auction Facility was an indicator that the borrowing 
institutions were subjected to important dollar liquidity shortages since the beginning of 
the crisis, we use a linear regression model in order to test for that hypothesis. 
Additionally, we determine if commercial banks with higher conduit exposure were the 
largest beneficiaries of the TAF lending program. Banks that were providing explicit 
guarantees to conduit vehicles, as they were the most affected by the ABCP turmoil 
(Acharya et al., 2013) would benefit the most from the use of the Fed’s auction facility. 
We estimate the following baseline specification: 
                                                 
where                   is the natural logarithm of total TAF loan amounts received 
by bank   from the period from December 20, 2007, to March 11, 2010.    is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the bank   is an European banking institution sponsoring conduits’ 
investment in the US market, and 0, otherwise, and                  , as stated in 
Acharya et al. (2013), is the ratio of ABCP outstanding to bank equity.  
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6.2.3 Results 
 
Table 5. Banks borrowing from the Fed’s TAF Program 
This table analyzes both if banks with higher exposure to conduit activity and European banks sponsoring 
conduits’ investment in the United States, received the larger loan amounts through the TAF lending program, 
established by the Federal Reserve. The dependent variable, “Log(loan amount)”, is the natural logarithm of all 
TAF loans received by each bank, from December 20, 2007, until March 11, 2010. “Conduit exposure” is 
measured as the ratio of ABCP outstanding to total equity and “Dummy” is a binary variable that distinguishes 
European bank sponsors backing ABCP investment in the US from all other banking institutions. Control 
variables are as defined in the Appendix. 
We report standard errors in parentheses; *, **, *** define 1%, 5% and 10% significance. 
 
 
Log(loan amount) 
 
Event Regressions 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Dummy 1.779*** 
 
1.311*** 
 
(0.264) 
 
(0.389) 
Conduit Exposure 
 
2.063*** 1.012*** 
  
(0.296) (0.345) 
No. of observations 283 283 283 
R-squared 0.140 0.148 0.174 
 
Table 5 presents the results. Column 1 tests for our main hypothesis, that European 
banking institutions’ sponsoring conduit vehicles in the US received larger loan 
amounts through the TAF lending program, established by the Federal Reserve. The 
results indicate that, on average, and for European bank sponsors backing ABCP 
investment in the U.S., the natural logarithm of the total TAF loan amount was 1.78 
percentage points higher than for all other commercial banks in the sample. The dummy 
variable on column 1 is statistical significant at the 1 percent level. 
On column 2, we show that, on average, an increase of 1 percent on conduit exposure 
increases the natural logarithm of the total TAF loan amount by 2.06 percentage points. 
The variable “Conduit Exposure” is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Column 3 presents the estimation results. The coefficient for “Conduit Exposure” 
reduces to 1.31 percentage points, but remains statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level, and the coefficient of the dummy variable decreases to 1.01 percentage points, 
continuing to be significant, also at the 1 percent level. 
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Our results show that not only commercial bank sponsors were the largest beneficiaries 
of the Term Auction Facility, during the crisis period, but also that European sponsoring 
institutions which were backing conduits’ investment in the US made the most use of 
the Fed’s program. This conclusion is consistent with the results on our first regression 
analysis, that European commercial banks sponsoring conduit vehicles in the US were 
the most affected by the financial turmoil. Because of the differences in access to 
liquidity, with European banks facing extensive difficulties in rolling over their US 
short-term debts, the TAF lending program, together with the Credit Swap Lines 
Facility, allowed European bank sponsors to increase their dollar funding, since 
December, 2007.  
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7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence that European banks sponsoring conduit 
vehicles in the United States were the most affected by the ABCP shock that started on 
August 9, 2007. We argue that European bank sponsors investing in the US ABCP 
market faced additional exposure to conduit activity because, in the event that their 
funding positions could not be rolled over, they had to repay their creditors in non-
domestic currency. Thus, at the onset of the financial crisis, when both the interbank 
and the foreign exchange markets were facing serious disruptions and banks had to tap 
into alternative funding sources to offset losses on conduit activity, European banks 
could not increase their dollar funding by as much as they needed. Differently from 
banks headquartered in the US, that had direct access to the domestic deposits market 
and to the Federal Home Bank Loans system, foreign banks had to try to raise liquidity 
in the dollar-denominated wholesales market or by accessing local deposits and 
exchanging them into US dollars. 
 We also find that both banking institutions with higher conduit exposure and European 
banks sponsoring conduits’ investment in the US have received the largest loan amounts 
from the TAF lending program established by the Fed on December 12, 2007. This 
conclusion is consistent with the results in our first baseline specification, revealing that 
European bank sponsors investing in the US, as they were facing the highest liquidity 
shortages since the beginning of the ABCP turmoil, were the most affected by the 
financial crisis and, therefore, became the most active borrowing participants from the 
Fed’s aid program. 
  
 44 
 
8. Bibliography 
 
Acharya, V. V., and Schnabl, P. (2010), “Do global banks spread global 
imbalances&quest; asset-backed commercial paper during the financial crisis of 2007–
09”, IMF Economic Review, 58(1), pp. 37-73.  
Acharya, V. V., and Richardson, M. (2009) “Causes of the financial crisis”, Critical 
Review, 21(2-3), pp. 195-210 
Acharya, V. V., Afonso, G., and Kovner, A. (2007), “How do global banks scramble for 
liquidity? Evidence from the asset-backed commercial paper freeze of 2007”, Evidence 
from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Freeze of 
Acharya, V. V., Schnabl, P., and Suarez, G. (2013), “Securitization without risk 
transfer”, Journal of Financial economics, 107(3), pp. 515-536  
Adrian, T., Burke, C. R., and McAndrews, J. (2009), “The federal reserve’s primary 
dealer credit facility” Current Issues in Economics and Finance, 15(4) 
Armantier, O., Ghysels, E., Sarkar, A., and Shrader, J. (2010), “Stigma in financial 
markets: Evidence from liquidity auctions and discount window borrowing during the 
crisis”, Available at SSRN 1572066 
Arteta, C. O., Carey, M., Correa, R., and Kotter, J. D. (2013), “Revenge of the 
Steamroller: ABCP as a Window on Risk Choices”, FRB International Finance 
Discussion Paper, (1076) 
Baba, N., McCauley, R. N., and Ramaswamy, S. (2009), “US dollar money market 
funds and non-US banks”, BIS Quarterly Review, March  
Bank for International Settlements (2009), Report on Special Purpose Entities, 
September, http://www.bis.org/publ/joint23.pdf, accessed on 9 November, 2014 
 
 45 
 
Bengtsson, E. (2013), “Shadow banking and financial stability: European money market 
funds in the global financial crisis”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 32, 
pp. 579-594 
Benmelech, E. (2012), “An Empirical Analysis of the Fed's Term Auction 
Facility” (No. w18304), National Bureau of Economic Research  
Bens, D. A., and Monahan, S. J. (2008), “Altering Investment Decisions to Manage 
Financial Reporting Outcomes: Asset‐Backed Commercial Paper Conduits and FIN 
46”, Journal of Accounting Research, 46(5), pp. 1017-1055 
Bernanke, B. (2008), “Liquidity provision by the Federal Reserve”, In Speech at the 
Risk Transfer Mechanisms and Financial Stability Workshop, Basel, Switzerland, on 
May (Vol. 29, p. 2008) 
Bernanke, B. (2009a), “The federal reserve’s balance sheet: An update”, In Speech at 
the Federal Reserve Board Conference on Key Developments in Monetary Policy, 
Washington, DC (Vol. 8). 
Bernanke, B. S. (2009b), “The crisis and the policy response”, Stamp Lecture, London 
School of Economics, January, 13 
Bernanke, B. S. (2010), “Causes of the recent financial and economic crisis”, Statement 
before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, Washington, September, 2 
Bernanke, B. S., Bertaut, C. C., DeMarco, L., and Kamin, S. B (2011), “International 
capital flows and the return to safe assets in the United States, 2003-2007”, FRB 
International Finance Discussion Paper, (1014) 
Bezemer, D. J. (2011), “The credit crisis and recession as a paradigm test”, Journal of 
Economic Issues, 45(1), 1-18.  
Bordo, M. D., Humpage, O., and Schwartz, A. J. (2012), “Epilogue: Foreign-exchange-
market Operations in the Twenty-first Century” (No. w17984), National Bureau of 
Economic Research 
 46 
 
Broz, J. L. (2012), “The Federal Reserve as Global Lender of Last Resort, 2007-
2011”, Winner: Best Paper Award, International Political Economy Society (IPES), 
University of Virginia, November, 9-10 
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2008), “Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007-08” 
(No. w14612), National Bureau of Economic Research 
Calomiris, C. W., Himmelberg, C. P., and Wachtel, P. (1995), “Commercial paper, 
corporate finance, and the business cycle: a microeconomic perspective”, In Carnegie-
Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy (Vol. 42, pp. 203-250), North-Holland. 
Campbell, S., Covitz, D., Nelson, W., and Pence, K. (2011), “Securitization markets 
and central banking: An evaluation of the term asset-backed securities loan 
facility”, Journal of Monetary Economics, 58(5), pp. 518-531 
Cecchetti, S. G. (2008), “Monetary policy and the financial crisis of 2007-2008”, CEPR 
Policy Insight, 21 
Cecchetti, S. G. (2009), “Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve in the Early Stages 
of the Financial Crisis (Digest Summary)”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23(1), 
pp. 51-75 
Cetorelli, N., and Goldberg, L. S. (2012), “Liquidity management of US global banks: 
Internal capital markets in the great recession”, Journal of International 
Economics, 88(2), pp. 299-311 
Covitz, D. M., Liang, N., and Suarez, G. A. (2009), “The evolution of a financial crisis: 
Panic in the asset-backed commercial paper market”, Division of Research & Statistics 
and Monetary Affairs, Federal Reserve Board 
Duprey, T., and LÉ, M. (2014), “Bankscope dataset: getting started”, Available at SSRN 
2191449 
Duygan-Bump, B., Parkinson, P., Rosengren, E., Suarez, G. A., and Willen, P. (2013), 
“How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity Facilities? Evidence 
 47 
 
from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility”, The Journal of Finance, 68(2), pp. 715-737 
Dwyer, G. P., and Tkac, P. (2009), “The financial crisis of 2008 in fixed-income 
markets”, Journal of International Money and Finance, 28(8), pp. 1293-1316  
Fitch Ratings (2001), “Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Explained”, 
http://people.stern.nyu.edu/igiddy/ABS/fitchabcp.pdf, accessed on 4 May, 2015 
Gorton, Gary B. (2008), “The panic of 2007”, No. w14358, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2008 
Gorton, G. B. (2009), “Information, liquidity, and the (ongoing) panic of 2007”, (No. 
w14649), National Bureau of Economic Research 
Gorton, G. B., and Metrick, A. (2009), “Haircuts”, (No. w15273), National Bureau of 
Economic Research  
Gorton, G., Metrick, A., Shleifer, A., and Tarullo, D. K. (2010), “Regulating the 
shadow banking system [with comments and discussion]”, Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, pp. 261-312 
Gorton, G., and Metrick, A. (2012), “Securitized banking and the run on repo”, Journal 
of Financial economics, 104(3), pp. 425-451 
Gourinchas, P. O., Rey, H., and Truempler, K. (2012), “The financial crisis and the 
geography of wealth transfers”, Journal of International Economics, 88(2), pp. 266-283  
Hördahl, P., and King, M. R. (2008), “Developments in repo markets during the 
financial turmoil”, BIS Quarterly, December 
Ivashina, V., Scharfstein, D. S., and Stein, J. C. (2012), “Dollar funding and the lending 
behavior of global banks”, (No. w18528), National Bureau of Economic Research  
 48 
 
Kacperczyk, M., and Schnabl, P. (2009), “When safe proved risky: commercial paper 
during the financial crisis of 2007-2009”, (No. w15538), National Bureau of Economic 
Research 
Kamin, S. B., and DeMarco, L. P. (2012), “How did a domestic housing slump turn into 
a global financial crisis?”, Journal of international money and finance, 31(1), pp. 10-41 
Keys, B. J., Mukherjee, T. K., Seru, A., and Vig, V. (2008), “Did securitization lead to 
lax screening? Evidence from subprime loans”, Evidence from Subprime Loans 
(December 25, 2008), EFA 
Krishnamurthy, A., Nagel, S., and Orlov, D. (2014), “Sizing up repo”, The Journal of 
Finance, 69(6), pp. 2381-2417  
McCabe, P. E. (2010), “The cross section of money market fund risks and financial 
crises”  
McGuire, P., and Von Peter, G. (2009), “The US dollar shortage in global banking and 
the international policy response”  
Mishkin, F. S. (2010), “Over the cliff: From the subprime to the global financial 
crisis”, (No. w16609), National Bureau of Economic Research  
 
Moody’s Investors Service (2003), The Fundamentals of Asset-Backed Commercial 
Paper, http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2010/mcm/pdf/Rutan1.pdf, 
accessed on 9 November, 2014 
Post, M. A., Schoenbeck, M. A., and Payne, J. A. (1992), “Evolution of the US 
Commercial Paper Market since 1980”, The. Fed. Res. Bull., pp. 78, 879 
Pozsar, Z., Adrian, T., Ashcraft, A. B., and Boesky, H. (2010), “Shadow banking”, 
Available at SSRN 1640545 
 49 
 
Schroth, E., Suarez, G. A., and Taylor, L. A. (2014), “Dynamic debt runs and financial 
fragility: Evidence from the 2007 ABCP crisis”, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 112(2), pp. 164-189 
Schwartz, A. F. (2014), “Housing policy in the United States”, Routledge 
Shen, P. (2002), “Why has the nonfinancial commercial paper market shrunk 
recently?”, Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, 88(1), pp. 55-76 
Shin, H. S. (2012), “Global banking glut and loan risk premium”, IMF Economic 
Review, 60(2), pp. 155-192  
Taylor, J. B., and Williams, J. C. (2008), “A black swan in the money market”, (No. 
w13943), National Bureau of Economic Research  
Thornton, D. L. (2010), “The effectiveness of unconventional monetary policy: the term 
auction facility”, Available at SSRN 1699356 
Wu, T. (2008), “On the effectiveness of the Federal Reserve's new liquidity 
facilities”, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Working Paper, (2008-08) 
Wu, T. (2011), “The us money market and the term auction facility in the financial 
crisis of 2007-2009”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(2), pp. 617-631 
  
 50 
 
Appendix A 
 
Table A. Variable definitions 
This table defines the variables used throughout our empirical analysis. 
 
Variable Definition  Source 
ABCP outstanding Total asset-backed commercial paper outstanding   Moody's Investors Service 
Conduit exposure 
Total asset-backed commercial paper outstanding divided by total 
equity 
Moody's Investors Service, 
Bankscope 
Assets Total bank assets Bankscope 
Equity Total bank equity Bankscope 
Return on Assets Net income divided by total assets Bankscope 
Share short-term 
debt Short-term debt divided by total assets Bankscope 
Share deposits Deposits divided by total assets Bankscope 
Stock return Total return index (RI) Datastream 
 
